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Abstract 
Low electricity prices put economic pressure on hydropower companies. A more flexible water fee design can coun-
teract this pressure and support hydropower companies during times when market revenues are low. However, this 
comes at the cost of lower revenues for resource owners. Using a sample of cost data for 62 companies and revenue 
data derived from an electricity market model, we have quantified this trade-off for the case of Switzerland. We found 
that electricity market price developments dominate changes in water fees and that for the profitability of hydro-
power, electricity prices are more important than water fee levels. However, with electricity prices of around CHF 40 
per MWh, water fees can make the difference between profit and loss. Therefore, while flexible water fee regimes 
shift the market risk from producers to resource owners to some extent, the extent of this risk shift depends on the 
detailed design of the flexible regime.
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1 Introduction
The exploitation of natural resources such as hydropower 
generates resource rents, which can be defined as the 
difference between the revenue from selling a natural 
resource and the cost of extracting it. These rents can be 
allocated to the resource owner (usually the public sec-
tor) in the form of a tax on the rent, for instance, or they 
are absorbed by the resource user (state- or privately 
owned electricity companies). In the case of hydropower, 
the resource rent is the value of the electricity produced 
minus the cost of its generation (including capital invest-
ment, labor, and taxes).
Worldwide, many countries that are rich in hydro-
power levy royalties or fees on the use of their hydro 
resources (see, e.g., Pineau et  al., 2017; Glachant et  al., 
2015). Mostly, these fees are determined and fixed by 
political institutions. They do not—or only to a limited 
extent—reflect heterogeneous cost structures and chang-
ing revenue options for hydro producers. For resource 
owners, this has the advantage of stable income streams. 
Consequently, all the market risk lies with the produc-
ers, who pay the same fee irrespective of their economic 
circumstances.
Such fee structures do not adequately reflect the eco-
nomic value of the resource, but most owe their existence 
to historical, political, or practical reasons. Glachant et al. 
(2015) provide an overview of hydropower regimes in 14 
European countries (including Switzerland), comparing 
concession regimes, obligations, and support schemes. 
An overview comparing China, Brazil, Canada, and the 
United States—the four leading hydropower produc-
ers globally—has concluded that royalties are generally 
determined in an “arbitrary and unsystematic manner” 
(Pineau et  al., 2017). One exception is Norway, where 
the government has implemented a tax of 37% on the 
resource rent of hydropower (OECD, 2019).1
Taking the case of Switzerland, where hydropower 
plants generate around 60% of the electricity consumed, 
this paper assesses the impact of changing from a fixed 
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hydropower, but it was abandoned in 2006 (Canton of Grisons Chancellery, 
2005).
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water fee regime to a more market-based solution. By 
considering revenue options and the costs related to 
the production of hydropower, we quantify the impact 
from two perspectives: (1) the rents of electricity pro-
ducers and (2) the revenues of resource owners. Finally, 
we address the question of whether and how a water fee 
design impacts the parties in question.
Currently, Switzerland has a fixed water fee, which is 
paid by the owners of hydropower plants to the cantons 
and municipalities owning the water resource rights. The 
Swiss government has set the maximum water fee level 
at CHF 110 per kW gross capacity (Art. 49 I, Swiss Water 
Rights Act (WRG)), based not on economic but rather 
on physical factors. In the past, the maximum water fee 
level was increased several times without strong oppo-
sition as the revenues of hydropower companies have 
been traditionally high due to high electricity prices and 
non-liberalized markets (i.e., captive end-consumers). 
However, due to partial market liberalization and lower 
international electricity prices, revenues have dropped, 
leading to cost pressures on hydropower companies. 
Consequently, Swiss hydropower producers have been 
calling for a change to a more flexible water fee regime, 
which would shift part of the market risk from electric-
ity producers to the owners of the resource—in this case, 
cantons and municipalities—and reduce the cost pres-
sure on companies. However, since for some cantons and 
municipalities, the revenue from water fees constitute a 
considerable share of their total budget, the prospect of 
lower incomes has led the cantons and municipalities to 
oppose a more flexible design (Frauendorfer & Schürle, 
2017).
Focusing on the year 2025, by which time the Swiss gov-
ernment intends to implement a new water fee regime, we 
evaluated different water fee reform options: (a) the cur-
rent fixed water fee, (b) a flexible water fee dependent on 
a reference market price and, therefore, reflecting revenue 
options of power plants, and (c) a tax on the resource 
rent, reflecting costs and revenues for each power plant. 
Specifically, we asked the following questions: “What 
is the impact of different regimes on the profitability of 
hydropower producers?” and “How does a change in 
regime affect the revenues of resource owners (cantons 
and municipalities)?” As the answers to these questions 
depend heavily on market outcomes, we distinguished 
four different developments, ranging from optimistic 
to pessimistic, concerning the electricity price. Conse-
quently, and in conclusion, we asked ourselves “How do 
the water fee regimes affect the distribution of market risk 
between resource users and resource owners?”.
Of course, a more sophisticated regime comes at the 
expense of a greater administrative burden, and—in the 
case of a tax on resource rents—higher transparency 
requirements are needed for the companies involved. 
Analysis of the impact of the different regimes might also 
provide information on whether a more elaborate regime 
is justified.
For our analysis, we combined a sample of cost data 
for 62 companies (“Partnerwerke”) with revenue data 
derived from the Swissmod electricity market model 
(Schlecht & Weigt, 2014) based on the WASTA (“Statis-
tik der Wasserkraftanlagen”) database (Swiss Federal 
Office of Energy, SFOE, 2016, 2017). We matched cost 
and revenue data to calculate the net profits of hydro-
power under different water fee regimes. The design of 
the regimes we analyzed is based on existing policies and 
assumptions about future policy design.
The following four main insights emerge from our anal-
ysis: First, electricity market price developments domi-
nate water fee changes. In other words, electricity prices 
are more important than water fee levels for the profit-
ability of hydropower. Second, with electricity prices of 
around CHF 40 per MWh, water fees can make the dif-
ference between profit and loss. Third, there is a larger 
variability between power plants than between scenarios. 
For every scenario, we find plants that would be making 
a profit and others that would be making a loss. On the 
other hand, a tax on resource rents decreases this differ-
ence between companies, leading to more equally distrib-
uted profits across companies. Fourth, water fee regimes 
that consider electricity market price developments can 
result in up to 80% higher revenues for resource owners 
in a good year. By contrast, in years with very low elec-
tricity prices, resource owners would receive up to 70% 
less revenue in the case of a flexible regime and might 
receive nothing at all in the case of a tax on the resource 
rent. In summary, while flexible water fee regimes can 
shift the market risk from producers to resource owners 
to some extent, the extent of this risk shift depends on 
the details of how the flexible regime is designed.
The idea of a market-based water fee system is not new 
for Switzerland. Before the introduction of (partial) mar-
ket liberalization, Banfi et al. (2005) claimed that a more 
flexible system was needed to take into account the dif-
ferent production costs of plants as well as the variation 
in electricity prices over time. Banfi and Filippini (2010) 
proposed the introduction of a water fee system based on 
a resource rent tax and estimated the impact on utilities 
and their competitiveness as well as the financial implica-
tions for the resource owners, the cantons and munici-
palities. These two early contributions provide a solid 
foundation for the discussion in this study, especially 
through their detailed review of the necessity of a flexible 
water fee system and a resource rent tax, in particular.
Later studies have focused mainly on production cost 
data (see Filippini & Geissmann, 2014, 2018). For our 
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own study, we extend the approach of modelling the 
financial implications of a shift to include a resource rent 
tax system, using recent cost data and a detailed bottom-
up electricity market model to reflect the revenue side 
in different scenarios. We further broaden the quantita-
tive analysis by modelling a flexible water fee system that 
depends on a reference market price.
The contribution of this paper is, therefore, twofold. 
First, we create a unique data set, combining updated 
cost and modeled revenue data from power plants to 
derive their resource rents. Second, we analyze the effects 
of different assumptions on international market devel-
opments and nationally determined water fee regimes 
through a detailed bottom-up electricity market model. 
This approach allows us to assess the impact of changing 
water fee regimes on both the profitability of companies 
and the revenues of resource owners.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
The following section explains the situation for hydro-
power generation in 2015/16, as well as data construc-
tion and the electricity market model used for revenue 
calculation. Section 3 introduces the scenario design for 
future market conditions and water fee regimes, while 
Sect. 4 discusses the impact on companies and resource 
owners, respectively, as well as the findings for different 
reference market prices. Section  5 closes with a discus-
sion and conclusions.
2  A first look at the data: the Swiss hydropower 
situation
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we provide some 
policy context on water fees in Switzerland and present 
the economic situation for Swiss hydropower in 2015/16 
based on cost and revenues. Second, we describe the data 
sources and construction.
2.1  Water fees: past, present, and future
Currently, Switzerland has a fixed water fee paid by the 
owners of hydropower plants to the owners of the water 
resource rights. According to federal legislation (Art. 76 
IV of the Swiss Federal Constitution and Art. 2 I of the 
Swiss Water Rights Act (WRG)), this right lies with the 
cantons2 and can be transferred to other parties, such as 
municipalities, districts, and cooperatives, either in part 
or its entirety. The Swiss government has the right to 
determine the maximum water fee level (Art. 49 I WRG). 
The water fee is based on the gross capacity of a plant and 
is estimated using the gradient and the amount of water 
that can be used for electricity generation, depending 
on the hydrological conditions as defined in the conces-
sion. Consequently, it is not based on economic factors 
but on physical principles. Hence, in contrast to a tax on 
the resource rent, it takes no account of changing mar-
ket conditions or different production costs across power 
plants.
The water fee level has been adjusted several times 
since its introduction in 1918 when it started at a level of 
CHF 6 per horsepower (around CHF 8.16 per kW). The 
last increase occurred in two increments from 80 CHF/
kW to 100 CHF/kW in January 2011 and 110 CHF/kW in 
January 2015. Launched in 2008 by a parliamentary ini-
tiative, the last increase was justified by higher peaks and 
balancing electricity prices, the higher value of energy 
storage, and adjustment for inflation (Swiss Federal 
Council, 2018).
However, soon after increasing the water fee maximum, 
the situation changed: Electricity wholesale market prices 
and thus hydropower plant profits fell. The economic cri-
sis, the low price of coal and  CO2 certificates, and subsi-
dies for renewable energies in European countries all led 
to a significant drop in overall electricity wholesale mar-
ket prices and reduced the spread between peak and off-
peak prices. Peak prices dropped from 152 CHF/MWh in 
2008 to 44.79 CHF/MWh in 2016, and the spread from 
34 CHF/MWh to 3.5 CHF/MWh (Swiss Federal Council, 
2018). These developments significantly decreased the 
revenue options and thus the profitability of hydropower, 
particularly for storage and pumped storage plants.
Figure  1 shows the production costs and revenues of 
two different types of hydropower plants in 2015/16. On 
average, costs including water fees are higher than rev-
enues.3 Hydropower plants, especially (pumped) storage 
plants, suffered from net losses, whereas—on average—
they would have been profitable without water fees.
This critical situation for companies has been exacer-
bated by the partial liberalization of the electricity mar-
ket, which no longer allows producers to sell (all) their 
electricity to captive customers at generation cost, but 
obliges them to sell at market prices.4 These market and 
regulatory developments, together with the legal require-
ment to review water fee levels by 2024, have led to the 
recent discussion about reforming the water fee regime.
2 Besides the earnings from water fees, cantons with hydropower plants 
receive the proceeds from taxes on income and property. Much of this tax 
revenue flows to cantons, with a smaller share going to municipalities. In 
addition, the cantons may receive dividends when holding the shares of the 
hydropower utilities and profit taxes. Some of the latter may also generate rev-
enue for the Swiss government.
3 The average water fees were estimated based on the actual water fee pay-
ments of companies in our sample.
4 In Switzerland, large electricity consumers have been able choose their 
suppliers since 2009 (partial liberalization). It is likely that in the near future, 
small consumers (households) will also be able choose their suppliers (com-
plete liberalization).
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Currently, the most likely policy change is for flexible 
water fees which depend on electricity prices and, there-
fore, reflect revenue options for hydropower, causing 
higher when market revenues are high and vice versa.5 
However, a flexible regime would not reflect the hetero-
geneity in the cost structures of individual power plants, 
although this could be achieved by placing a tax on the 
resource rent, which would take individual costs and rev-
enues into consideration. In this paper, all three options 
are analyzed: a fixed fee, a flexible fee, and a tax on the 
resource rent.6
2.2  Production cost
Figure 1 shows the average production cost for all com-
panies in our sample.7 The average cost (using a financial 
cost accounting approach8) is about 53.2 CHF/MWh, of 
which 12.0  CHF/MWh or 23% is due to water fee pay-
ments. This implies that the average cost net of water fees 
is 41.2 CHF/MWh.
Figure  1 further distinguishes between run-of-river 
and (pumped) storage. The cost structure of the com-
pany types varies significantly. The costs of companies 
classified as (pumped) storage tend to be higher (58.0 
CHF/MWh) compared with run-of-river plants (42.7 
CHF/MWh). The following three reasons explain this 
difference:
First, pumped storage plants are more capital-intensive 
than run-of-river plants because of their technological 
complexity. Also, they tend to be built in geographically 
remote areas with complicated Alpine topography, while 
run-of-river plants primarily built in flat and easily reach-
able areas in the densely populated midlands of Switzer-
land. Second, they incur higher operating costs due to the 
electricity required to pump water when prices are low. 
Third, in recent years, several large construction pro-
jects have been undertaken in Switzerland to expand the 
pumped storage capacity, which has led to an increase in 
capital costs.
Besides these mainly exogenous factors, cost might also 
differ due to endogenous cost drivers such as the effi-
ciency of operational processes. Based on Banfi and Filip-
pini (2010) and Filippini et al. (2018), who did, however, 
not point towards systematic patterns in cost efficiency 
differences across plant types, we assume that such inef-
ficiencies are randomly and uniformly distributed across 
plants and plant types. The share of the water fee of the 
total production costs is 27% (11.6 CHF/MWh) for run-
of-river and 21% (12.2 CHF/MWh) for (pumped) storage. 
This implies that the cost net of water fees is 31.2 CHF/
MWh for run-of-river and 45.9 CHF/MWh for (pumped) 
storage.
Fig. 1 Average production costs and revenues in 2015/16. Note: For data sources and construction, see Sect. 2.2
5 Following the Swiss Federal Council, six variations are to be assessed (Swiss 
Federal Council, 2018): (i) a flexible water fee (with a fixed and a variable 
part); (ii) a tax on the resource rent; (iii) no federal maximum water fee level 
but qualitative guidance; (iv) cantonal regulation only, no maximum imposed 
at a federal level; (v) a levy on consumers, for example, via a network sur-
charge (instead of concession holders); and (vi) integration into the national 
fiscal equalization scheme.
6 In Betz et al. (2019), we also looked at the impact of different designs of 
(partly) flexible water fee approaches. These are more closely related to the 
political debate in Switzerland, but they do not add any additional insights 
to the general discussion.
7 Disaggregated data are available on request.
8 The calculation of the production cost of hydropower companies can be 
estimated from a financial or imputed cost perspective. For our analysis, we 
use a financial cost perspective. Information on the imputed costs perspec-
tive is provided by Filippini and Geissmann (2018).
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Figure 2 shows the individual production costs of each 
plant in our sample in a pseudo-merit-order curve9 and 
confirms the substantial cost differences between plants. 
Generally, the production costs of (pumped) storage 
plants are higher, but they can also shift their production 
to times with higher prices and generate higher revenues 
(see following section).
We derived production costs for a panel data set of 62 
hydropower companies for 2015/16. Most of these com-
panies are so-called “Partnerwerke,” which means that 
different utilities jointly hold the concession for a power 
plant. Based on annual reports, income statements, and 
balance sheets, financial information is gathered and 
combined with the amount of electricity generated, the 
pump energy consumed, and the accumulated installed 
generator power, as provided by the Swiss Federal Office 
of Energy in WASTA, the statistics for hydropower plants 
in Switzerland (SFOE, 2016, 2017).
According to Filippini and Geissmann (2014, 2018), 
hydropower companies can be classified into four dis-
tinctive technical categories reflecting the predominant 
technology of the stations operated by a company. How-
ever, for the purpose of this study, we distinguish only 
between the two categories run-of-river and (pumped) 
storage10 resulting in the following numbers covered by 
our sample: 36 run-of-river companies and 28 (pumped) 
storage companies. This sample represents around 63% 
of modeled hydro generation in Swissmod, although only 
around 25% of the hydropower plants listed in WASTA. 
Looking at individual plant types, it represents around 
86% of the total expected storage production, 76% of the 
expected pumped storage production (79% of the total 
combined (pumped) storage generation), and around 
44% of the expected run-of-river production in 2016.
2.3  Revenue from the electricity market
In Fig. 1, a red bar shows the average revenues of hydro 
production in 2015 and 2016. These amounted to 
46.5 CHF/MWh.11 These revenues differ between the two 
plant types. Storage and pumped storage yield a much 
higher revenue of 47.4 CHF/MWh owing to their ability 
to generate electricity during peak price periods. In com-
parison, run-of-river plants, which usually operate non-
stop to provide baseload, have a revenue of 44.1  CHF/
MWh. However, due to a reduction in peak prices and 
price spreads in recent years, storage technologies have 
also experienced economic pressure.
For the market revenue12 estimates, we rely on simu-
lations from Swissmod, a Swiss and Central European 
electricity market model (Abrell et al., 2019; Schlecht & 
Weigt, 2014). Swissmod is a traditional cost minimizing 
or welfare-maximizing dispatch model based on a DC 
load flow approach (a model description is provided in 
“Appendix A”). It shows Switzerland in a detailed spatial 
resolution of approximately 230 nodes and 400 transmis-
sion lines with the surrounding countries Austria, Ger-
many, France, and Italy aggregated. Besides the detailed 
network representation, Swiss hydropower is repre-
sented in detail, with approximately 400 hydropower 
stations, which is 96% of Swiss hydropower production. 
Hydropower revenues are derived from the simulated 
hydropower dispatch (generation and pumping) and the 
resulting market prices. While Swissmod reproduces the 
dynamics of the day-ahead spot market, the market rev-
enues do not include additional revenue options from 
future, intra-day, or system service markets.
2.4  Resource rents: matching costs and revenues
Rents—or net profits—from hydropower are defined as 
revenues net of production costs. Therefore, to calculate 
Fig. 2 Pseudo-merit-order curve for 2015/16. Note: In contrast 
to a “real” merit-order curve, the pseudo-merit-order curve shows 
not  marginal but  average production cost. On the x-axis, we see 
cumulative annual production instead of installed capacities. For data 
sources and construction, see Sect. 2.2
9 In contrast to a “real” merit-order curve, the pseudo-merit-order curve 
shows not only marginal but also average production cost.
10 A company is categorized as run-of-river if more than 50% of the 
expected annual generation stems from run-of-river stations. Analogously, 
a company is of the (pumped) storage type if more than 50% of the expected 
electricity generation is generated by storage units.
11 The simulated day-ahead market price was 43.6 CHF/MWh in 2015.
12 Currently, the electricity market in Switzerland is only partially liberal-
ized, and revenues consist of two parts: revenues from selling electricity on 
the free market, and revenues from sales to captive customers. However, 
as we expect full market liberalization to commence by 2025, we only use 
market revenues for the purpose of our analysis. Introducing revenues from 
captive customers does not change the general results but relaxes the situa-
tion for companies with a large share of captive customers to some extent.
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the profitability of hydropower companies, we need to 
match the revenue data, calculated at a plant level, with 
the cost data, which are only available at a company 
(“Partnerwerk”) level. Using publicly available data on 
the plants of a company, we manually match the two data 
sets. During this process  we omit some information on 
the revenue side, as our company sample includes only 
around 63% of total hydropower production. In compari-
son, the revenue side can be calculated for 96% of total 
production.
3  Scenario design: water fee design options 
under various electricity market developments
Having presented the situation in 2015/16, we now turn 
to future developments. For four different electricity 
price developments for the year 2025, we analyze the 
impact of three different water fee design options.
3.1  Possible market developments for fuel and carbon 
prices
When water fees are flexibly designed, they depend on 
market developments. To analyze a broad range of pos-
sible developments, we use four different fuel and carbon 
price scenarios (see Table 1). Under the Base scenario, we 
assume that fuel and carbon prices stay constant at their 
2015 levels. In the other three scenarios, we addition-
ally alter fuel and carbon prices, as described in the table 
below.
The scenarios capture a range of possible market 
developments and are not a forecast of the most likely 
developments. The underlying demand and power plant 
portfolios develop according to the Swiss energy perspec-
tives 2050 (Prognos, 2012) for Switzerland and the EU 
Reference Scenario (European Commission, 2016) for the 
neighboring countries. The four price scenarios are based 
on real 2015 values, in other words, without inflation 
or changes in the exchange rate.13 They indicate mar-
ket income potentials for companies but do not capture 
all market and trading possibilities such as future and 
intra-day trading, system services, or special end-user 
tariffs for green/local production.
Table 2 shows the average spot market prices and unit 
revenues of run-of-river and (pumped) storage plants 
for 2025. The results highlight the broad range of pos-
sible future price levels and their dependency on Euro-
pean fuel and carbon prices. We observe average spot 
market prices from 31 CHF/MWh for the scenario with 
decreasing fuel and carbon prices to 95  CHF/MWh for 
the scenario with increasing fuel and carbon prices. Unit 
revenues are higher for (pumped) storage than for run-
of-river plants. Nevertheless, the fact that differences are 
not very pronounced between technologies shows that 
the spread between base and peak prices is still expected 
to be relatively low in 2025.
3.2  Three water fee regimes
We analyze three different water fee (WF) regimes: fixed 
fee, flexible fee, and tax on resource rent. In the latter two 
regimes, the average water fee revenues are equal across 
all three water fee regimes. In other words, in the flexible 
regimes, the water fee level depends on the development 
of fuel and carbon prices, but the expected value (aver-
age over all four fuel and carbon price realizations) is 
constant across regimes. The regimes are summarized in 
Table 3 and described below.
FIXED WATER FEE—The fixed water fee regime rep-
resents the current situation. Water fees are fixed at CHF 
110 per kW of gross capacity  (kWBr):
Table 1 Fuel and carbon price scenarios
Scenario Fuel and carbon price development
Base Fuel and carbon prices as in 2015
EU Fuel and carbon prices as in the EU Reference Scenario (European Commission, 2016)
C +  + F +  + Fast linear increase in carbon price (50€/t in 2030) and fuel prices (+ 100% until 2030)
C–F– Linear decrease in carbon price (4€/t in 2030) and fuel prices (− 50% until 2030)






C–F– 30.6 32.0 30.2 37.9
Base 42.2 44.2 41.0 55.0
EU 77.3 80.3 77.3 90.2
C +  + F +  + 94.9 98.8 94.6 112.8
13 For the conversion from EUR to CHF, we use an exchange rate of 1.0679 
CHF/€ in 2015 and 1.0902 CHF/€ in 2016 (based on www. ecb. europa. eu/ 
stats).
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For cantons and municipalities of Switzerland, this 
implies a constant revenue stream independent of the 
market situation; resource owners do not bear any mar-
ket risk. For the companies, however, a fixed water fee 
implies an ongoing cost, so they bear the entire market 
risk.
FLEXIBLE WATER FEE—The main principle of flexible 
water fee regimes is that the water fee level depends on 
a reference market price (RMP), reflecting the revenue 
possibilities of hydropower. How this reference market 
price is defined needs to be determined, however. For 
our analysis, we use the average unit revenue (CHF per 
MWh) of an average power plant as the RMP. Clearly, 
this is highly dependent on the wholesale electricity mar-
ket price. Also, water fees can be either wholly flexible or 
consist of a fixed part (minimum fee) and a flexible part. 
For our analysis, we assume a completely flexible water 
fee:
In principle, water fee payments depend on the revenue 
options of companies. If a hydropower plant can generate 
large revenues, their water fee payments are correspond-
ingly high—and the reverse also applies. Consequently, 
some market risk shifts to the resource owners, whose 
revenues are no longer constant but depend on mar-
ket outcomes. Nevertheless, production costs are not 
reflected in this calculation.
We need to determine a slope parameter α, where the 
expected water fee revenues are kept constant at the 
current level. For the given set of fuel and carbon price 
developments, we find that α = 1.75 (see Fig. 3).14
TAX ON RESOURCE RENT—The third water fee 
regime is a tax on the resource rent of each plant i. We 
(1)WF = 110CHF/kWBr
(2)WF = αRMP/kWBr
calculate the resource rent (RR) as the revenue (R) net of 
production cost (C)15:
Therefore, the annual water fee payments for each 
plant i correspond to
The tax level r needs to be determined such that the 
expected water fee revenues are kept constant at the 
current level. For the given set of fuel and carbon price 
developments—and assuming that producers making net 
losses pay zero tax—we find that r = 38.7%.16
In the case of a tax on resource rent, resource owners 
bear a much larger part of the market risk. Compared to 
the water fee regimes, the tax regime has two significant 
differences. First, it not only considers changing revenues 
(3)RRi = Ri − Ci
(4)WFi = r(Ri − Ci) = rRRi.
Table 3 Water fee regimes
Based on Swiss Federal Council (2017) and SFOE (2018a, b).  kWBr stands for kW of gross capacity
a The maximum water fee level allowed by federal regulation is set at 110 CHF/kWBr. Only the cantons of Bern, Jura, Zug, and Vaud stayed below this tax level (Swiss 
Federal Council, 2018). For our analysis, we use the observed water fee payments in 2015/16. As the flexible water fee payments are calculated in relation to observed 
payments, we assume that these cantons continue to have a relatively lower tax level
Regime Water fee (WF)
Fixed Current water fee level based on gross  capacitya WF = 110 CHF/kWBr
Flexible Flexible fee depending on reference market price (RMP) WF = 1.75 RMP/kWBr
Tax on resource rent Tax of 38.7% on resource rent WF = 0.387(R − C)
Fig. 3 Fixed versus flexible water fees. Note: Own calculation based 
on Swiss Federal Council (2017) and SFOE (2018a, b)
14 We manually determine the slope parameter α such that the expected total 
water fee revenues across all plants reach the current level of water fee pay-
ments.
15 Data sources and construction of revenue and costs are described in Sects. 
2.2 and 2.3.
16 This is comparable to the 37% tax level in Norway (OECD, 2019). If we 
allowed water fee payments to become negative (i.e., producers receive pay-
ments when their production costs exceed their market revenues), the nec-
essary tax level would be 48.9%.
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(such as the flexible water fee) but also considers the cost 
side. At this point, it should be explicitly pointed out 
that the tax on the resource rent can be credited to the 
cost of equity, so a minimum return on equity is guaran-
teed. Second, it takes into account the considerable het-
erogeneity across power plants. The tax on the resource 
rent is based directly on the economic value of water as 
a resource and, therefore, has a significantly improved 
allocative efficiency compared to the current system.17
Banfi and Filippini (2010) highlighted the fact that with 
a tax on resource rent, a plant has an incentive to increase 
cost through operational inefficiencies in order to forego 
any resource rent payment. They suggested that a bench-
mark of cost efficiency thus is necessary to ensure equi-
table taxation. While any practical implementation of a 
resource rent tax therefore incorporate checks to ensure 
efficiency, such concerns are less relevant for the model-
ling of this study: We operate with ex-post data, meaning 
data stemming from a regulatory framework with a fixed 
water fee system, where plants had an incentive to oper-
ate at cost efficiency.
3.3  Impact of market developments on water fees 
and profits
As is obvious from the previous sections, the profit pros-
pects are key to the assessment. In the following, we give 
a brief overview of how companies’ profits depend on 
price developments and water fee regimes.
A hydropower company’s net profit is determined by its 
revenue net of production cost and water fee payments:
where p contains fuel and carbon prices, indicating that 
a company’s revenues and—for the flexible regimes—
water fee payments depend on the market development. 
In the case of a flexible water fee regime, this is a direct 
link via the RMP; in the case of a tax on the resource rent, 
it is an indirect link via the impact on revenues.
Consequently, a change in fuel and carbon prices has 
the following consequences for companies’ net profits:
where both parts of the right-hand side are positive. In 
other words, if fuel and carbon prices increase, revenues 
but also water fee payments increase. Thus, flexible water 
fee regimes have an ambiguous impact on companies’ 
profits.











Importantly, water fees do not affect the operating 
decision of companies as they are perceived as fixed costs 
in the short run, meaning, as long as no investment deci-
sions have to be made. Thus, water fee regimes do not 
directly affect wholesale market electricity prices and 
operational decisions. In each of the four market scenar-
ios in Table 1, the companies will obtain the same mar-
ket revenue. Therefore, profit differences within a market 
scenario are solely the result of the different water fee 
regimes.
In contrast, water fees have an impact on long run 
investment decisions of companies as they influence 
(expected) net profits, given a likelihood for each market 
scenario that the expected profit across all potential mar-
ket developments will differ according to the water fee 
regimes. Thus, water fee regimes can impact the available 
production capacities and, therefore, wholesale electric-
ity market prices in the long run.
Similar, increases in fuel or carbon prices will also 
alter investment incentives for all market participants 
and therefore could alter long run market develop-
ments (i.e. higher carbon prices may lead to a faster shift 
towards renewable generation changing the market price 
structure).
4  Findings: the impact of different water fee 
design options
4.1  The resource user’s perspective
We assume that costs net of water fees remain at their 
2015/16 levels18 and use the simulated revenues to calcu-
late net profits. Figure 4 shows the net profits per MWh 
of hydropower in 2025 for the different scenarios and 
water fee regimes.
Figure 4 illustrates the following: First, we observe that 
market impact dominates the impact of water fees. In sit-
uations where electricity prices are high, the lower quar-
tile clearly lies above zero; in fact, more than 75% of all 
plants in the sample make a profit—even if water fee lev-
els are very high. If, on the other hand, electricity prices 
are low, the median falls below zero and more than half 
of the plants in the sample make a loss—again indepen-
dently of the water fee regime.
Second, the results for all three water fee regimes are 
within the same range. None of the regimes lead to a 
completely different net profit structure. This also hinges 
on the choice of design parameters for the respective 
policies, meaning the tax rate or the slope of the flexible 
water fee.
18 Again, we use real 2015 values, without inflation or changes in the 
exchange rate.
17 In fact, Banfi et al. (2004) describe the tax on the resource rent as being the 
most efficient tax in terms of economic criteria such as allocative efficiency or 
horizontal or vertical equality.
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Third, in the low-price scenarios, companies are better 
off with a tax on the resource rent, followed by a flexible 
water fee and a fixed water fee. When electricity prices 
are low, the flexible approach leads to lower water fee 
payments and higher net profits. In contrast, in the high 
price scenarios, companies are better off with the current 
fixed price scenario. In the case of a tax on the resource 
rent and the flexible water fee approach, they have to pay 
higher fees and suffer from lower profits as a result.
Fourth, for the Base scenario market development, 
the level of water fees determines whether the median 
hydropower plant is profitable or not. In such a case, 
the electricity market price is at a level of slightly above 
40  CHF/MWh. Within this range of around 40 to 
60 CHF/MWh, costs without water fees correspond to 
revenues. Consequently, water fees can make the differ-
ence between profit and loss.
Fifth, there is a large variability between plants, as 
seen by the size of the boxplots and whiskers (Fig.  4 
does not include outliers). Below, we describe the 
results for individual plants in detail.
Sixth, the range of net profit is the smallest in the 
resource rent case. This result stems from the design 
of the policy since companies with higher rents need 
to pay more compared to companies with lower rents, 
resulting in a convergence of net profits.
So far, we have focused on aggregated impact, but 
there are large differences in unit production costs 
and revenue possibilities between companies. Figure 5 
shows the individual results for all the companies in the 
sample, enabling a more detailed analysis.
A closer look at the individual companies shows 
that the variability across companies is larger than the 
Fig. 4 Boxplots of unit net profits in 2025 for market scenarios 
and water fee regimes. Note: Boxes include median, 25th and 75th 
percentiles. Whiskers are defined as 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
Outliers are not shown. The market revenue for each company for a 
given market scenario is independent from the water fee regime and 
differences shown within the scenarios are solely the result of the 
different water fee regimes
Fig. 5 Net profits of all companies in our sample in 2025
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variability induced by different water fee levels. Never-
theless, within each price scenario, the water fee level 
makes the difference between profit or loss for several 
companies. Finally, the graph clearly shows how a tax 
on the resource rent decreases the variability in net 
profit between plants as, by definition, a tax of 100% 
would absorb the entire resource rent, leading to zero 
net profit.
In summary, we find that the influence of market devel-
opments dominates the impact of water fee regimes on 
the profitability of hydro power plants, while the varia-
bility across plants is extensive. Nevertheless, our results 
also show that water fee regimes that take market out-
comes into account can reduce some of the pressure on 
the profitability of hydropower. However, this can only be 
part of, and not the entire solution. Also, the more flex-
ible a regime’s design, the more pronounced this effect.
4.2  The resource owner’s perspective
A new water fee regime would affect not only producers 
but also resource owners, namely the Swiss cantons and 
municipalities which receive water fee revenues.
4.2.1  Changes in water fee payments
Figure 6 shows the water fee payments for different price 
scenarios and water fee regimes. In line with the compa-
nies’ perspective, we find that in years with high electric-
ity prices, revenues are higher with a flexible water fee 
regime than under today’s water fee regime. However, 
in years with low electricity prices, revenues can be sub-
stantially lower. In theory, they could even be negative in 
the case of a tax on resource rents. However, in reality, 
water fee payments are set to zero when company costs 
exceed revenue.
For the high price scenarios (EU Trend and C++F++), 
revenues from water fee payments can as much as double 
when the design considers changing market conditions. 
This impact is significantly more pronounced for a tax 
on the resource rent as compared to a flexible water tax 
based on a reference market price.
For the low-price scenarios, however, revenues sig-
nificantly decrease, and differences between the various 
regimes are considerable. In the case of a flexible water 
fee, revenues decrease by up to 40% in years with low 
electricity prices. When levying a tax on the resource 
rent, we observe that revenues can drop by almost 90%.19
4.2.2  The impact of ownership structures
Our analysis distinguishes between producers paying the 
water fees and an aggregate of resource owners receiving 
the payments. However, in reality, these ownership struc-
tures are more complicated (see Hediger et al., 2019a, b, 
for a more detailed analysis). In the following section, we 
provide a qualitative assessment of the implications of 
real ownership structures on the results and the practica-
bility of a tax on resource rents in the Swiss context.
In Switzerland, most hydropower companies are 
owned by cantons and municipalities. This makes them 
the owners of both the resource and the company (e.g., 
the Canton of Bern owns 52% of BKW,20 see Cometta 
et al., 2016). However, the characteristics differ between 
cantons. Cantons rich in hydro resources are mostly situ-
ated in the mountains, so mountainous cantons are the 
primary beneficiaries of water fee payments. Cantons 
owning most of the hydropower companies, on the other 
hand, are usually financially strong low-land cantons 
(the Canton of Zurich, e.g., directly owns 18.3% of Axpo, 
and an additional 18.4% indirectly through the Canton’s 
Fig. 6 Revenues from water fees for different scenarios 2025. Note: 
As described in Sect. 2.2, our sample covers only around 63% of total 
hydropower production. Analogously, the water fee payments in our 
sample amount to around 63% of payments observed
19 In our main results, we restrict the tax on the resource rent to be positive. 
However, in theory, this tax can become negative if companies make losses. 
In such a case, the tax level would need to be set at 48.9% in order to equalize 
the average water fee revenues across scenarios. In other words, in good years 
companies would need to pay almost 50% of their resource rents to the state. 
In return, this would imply that in the lowest-price scenario (C–F–) resource 
owners such as the cantons and municipalities would need to pay more than 
CHF 100 million to compensate, in part, for the net losses of companies 
(detailed results are available on request).
If extrapolated to the universe of Swiss hydro power plants, this amount 
would increase to around CHF 165 million (as our sample covers around 
63% of total hydropower production). This number is significantly larger 
than the market premium which is currently being paid by the Swiss gov-
ernment to large hydro power plants which have to sell their electricity 
below production cost. In 2018 and 2019, companies received CHF 110 mil-
lion and CHF 65 million, respectively. Today, the Swiss federal government 
is offering compensation for these losses with revenues from electricity net-
work surcharges, whereas the cantons or municipalities that profited before 
from high water fees do not contribute to the compensation payments.
20 Bernische Kraftwerke.
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own power company, EKZ21 (Cometta et al., 2016)); low-
land cantons pay the water fees indirectly. Consequently, 
water fees induce a monetary transfer from the (richer) 
low-land cantons to the (poorer) mountain cantons.
Given that water fee payments make up roughly ten 
percent of national fiscal equalization, the amount of 
this additional transfer is substantial and, for some can-
tons and municipalities, a sizable proportion of their total 
budget. A drastic cut in water fee revenue through flexi-
bilization would trigger severe financial problems. For 
these reasons, mountainous cantons oppose the flexibi-
lization of water fees as they fear lower revenues, while 
some low-land cantons would benefit from flexibilization 
since their companies would not make such high losses. 
For a more detailed discussion on the feedback effects 
caused by ownership structures, see Betz et al. (2018).
4.3  The impact of different RMPs on a flexible water fee 
regime
In a flexible water fee regime, payments depend on the 
definition of the RMP (see Eq.  2). Thus, the RMP is a 
design element in itself and has an impact on water fee 
levels. In the following section, we consider three differ-
ent ways (options) of defining the RMP and assess the 
respective impact.
4.3.1  How to determine the RMP?
Currently, the most likely policy option on which to base 
the results defines the RMP as the average unit revenue22 
(uniform). An alternative option would be to define it as 
the annual average spot market price of electricity (spot), 
which would be the most straightforward, transparent 
option. However, this would not account for the fact that 
some hydropower plants shift their production to hours 
with high electricity market prices. Another alternative 
would be to use the average unit revenue per technology 
(differentiated) as the RMP. In this case, we have differ-
ent RMPs and, therefore, water fee levels for run-of-river 
and (pumped) storage plants, respectively. While this 
option accounts for the varying revenue options of differ-
ent plant types, it is more complex to implement and less 
transparent than the other two options (Table 4).
In summary, when defining the RMP, policymakers face 
a trade-off between being transparent/straightforward 
and taking account of the different realities of individual 
producers. By analyzing the three options, we can pro-
vide an initial estimation of the magnitude of the impact.
Before turning to the impact of different reference price 
definitions on water fee payments, we analyze how much 
they differ. Table 2 (in Sect. 3.1) shows the RMP for 2025 
for the three options and four market developments. It is 
important to remember that spot prices are very close to 
unit revenues for run-of-river plants while unit revenues 
for (pumped) storage plants are significantly higher. Con-
sequently, unit revenues of an average plant are slightly 
higher than spot market prices as they include character-
istics of both plant types.
4.3.2  Impact of reference market prices: uniform water fees 
favor (pumped) storage plants
Different water fee levels occur when we combine the 
different RMPs with a flexible water fee design. Figure 7 
shows the median water fee payments by plant type 
for the different reference price definitions and market 
developments in 2025.
We find that the results are very similar across different 
RMP options: The current definition of the RMP as aver-
age unit revenue leads to slightly higher water fee pay-
ments than the simpler option of taking the spot prices. 
Using differentiated RMPs would be favorable to run-
of-river plants but disadvantageous to (pumped) storage 
plants, which would have to pay somewhat higher water 
fees.
4.3.3  Distribution implications
Again, there are distribution implications for the can-
tons since (pumped) storage plants are located mainly 
in mountain regions. When water fees are differentiated 
and account for individual revenue options, (pumped) 
storage plants pay more. Consequently, mountain regions 
suffer less from a flexible water fee regime than if they 
were in a situation with non-differentiated RMPs.
Flexible water fee regimes shift the risk from producer 
to resource owners (or from low-land cantons to moun-
tainous regions). Differentiated reference market prices, 
on the other hand, increase the water fee payments for 
(pumped) storage plants and thus revenues for moun-
tain regions. By differentiating the RMP, the shift in risk 
from producers to resource owners still prevails, but the 
shift from low-land to mountain cantons is reduced. The 
extent to which this impacts the monetary flow between 
Table 4 Reference market price options
Option Definition of reference market price (RMP)
Spot Annual average spot market price
Uniform Annual average unit revenue for an average 
hydropower plant
Differentiated Unit revenue differentiated by type
22 In reality, not only revenues from the wholesale market but also from 
the markets of “ancillary services” (SDL) and “Certificate of origin” (HKN) 
would be taken into account. However, for our analysis we only consider 
wholesale market revenues.
21 Elektrizitätswerke des Kantons Zürich.
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cantons (and to other shareholders) is beyond the scope 
of this paper.
4.4  Summary: risk shift from resource user to resource 
owner
As discussed in the previous sections, the change from 
fixed water fees to flexible regimes where the water fee 
level is market-driven leads to a shift of the market risk 
from resource users (companies or low-land cantons, 
which own most of the companies) to resource owners 
(cantons or municipalities, often in mountain regions). 
With flexible water fees, this risk shift can be (partially) 
compensated using reference market prices differentiated 
by technology.
Table  5 summarizes the impact of different design 
options on the market risk for different stakeholders. We 
focus on years with low electricity prices as these are crit-
ical in the current discussion.
5  Discussion and conclusions
Hydropower has a key role in Switzerland’s electric-
ity system and represents an essential pillar of the envi-
sioned transition towards a future electricity system that 
is expected to be dominated by power generation from 
intermittent renewable energy sources such as wind and 
solar power. Given the importance of hydropower in a 
multitude of further domains such as agriculture, tour-
ism, flood control, biodiversity, and environmental ser-
vices, and the often-resulting significant local economic 
implications, the future role of hydropower is a reoccur-
ring theme in political debates. The assessment presented 
in this paper of the potential impact of different water fee 
reform options aims to contribute to these debates and 
highlights the challenges inherent in altering a status-quo 
framework.
The primary result of a flexible fee- or tax-based 
approach is a shift in market risk from the producers to 
the resource owners (in this case, mostly the Swiss can-
tons and municipalities). This is straightforward given 
the basic properties of a flexible water fee design. The 
feedback effects to local structures, producers, and the 
Swiss electricity system in general are less straightfor-
ward (see, e.g., Hediger et al., 2019b for an assessment of 
local effects in the canton of the Grisons). As our assess-
ment shows, electricity market developments can easily 
dominate the impact of the different regimes. Further-
more, the high heterogeneity between Swiss hydro com-
panies translates into a set of plants that make profits and 
others that make losses in every scenario combination. 
Thus, beside the risk allocation, the broader market and 
Fig. 7 Water fee payments for different reference market price options (median). Note: The market revenue for each company for a given market 
scenario is independent from the water fee regime and the differences shown are solely the result of the different water RMP designs
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policy developments also need to be considered. In the 
following, we discuss them along four current topics.
First, the overall market trend is, to a large extent, 
shaped by European developments. Our scenario selec-
tion tried to highlight potential price pathways; how-
ever, the actual development is uncertain. While, in the 
long run, an increasing emission permit price might be 
expected to also lead to an increasing wholesale price 
trend, there is no guarantee that this scenario will emerge 
at all. Furthermore, even if a price increase occurs, this 
may coincide with prolonged low-price periods and—
especially important for pumped storage plants—a low-
price spread between peak and off-peak periods due to 
the interplay between renewable generation and con-
ventional units (i.e., see Schlecht & Weigt, 2016). While 
a shift towards a more flexible water fee regime would 
reduce the overall uncertainty hydropower companies 
face, the bulk of the market risk would remain outside of 
the influence of Swiss companies and policy makers.
Second, the envisioned full market liberalization23 
will have a more direct influence on Swiss hydropower 
companies. Today, a share of hydro generation is sold 
to captive customers, thereby providing a cost recov-
ery insurance for those suppliers. A full liberalization of 
small-scale customers would open Swiss hydro genera-
tion to market competition. As our assessment shows, a 
share of the investigated companies has unfavorable cost 
structures and experiences losses even in more favorable 
price scenarios. While such firms could prevail with a 
captive customer base, they have a higher risk in an open 
market environment. Such firms would benefit from a tax 
approach as this would be directly linked to their profit 
structure. However, they would benefit only to a very 
small extent from a flexible water fee regime: In times of 
low market prices, their unfavorable cost structures will 
lead to high losses even with a reduced fee and in times of 
high market prices the fee level will increase and reduce 
their profitability prospects.
Third, another political concern is the Swiss supply 
situation during the winter months. Switzerland is usu-
ally import-dependent during those months, and the 
phase-out of nuclear stations is expected to increase the 
import share further. To increase winter production, the 
Swiss Federal Council has proposed the introduction of 
a storage reserve (SFOE, 2018b) and supports measures 
to increase hydro generation by 2 TWh.24 An adjustment 
of the water fee regime would not impact the incentives 
for hydropower companies to maximize their supply 
during high-priced winter hours as the fee itself has no 
impact on the operational incentive structure. However, 
the altered risk allocation could change long-term invest-
ment prospects.
As indicated above, the market uncertainty will likely 
remain the dominant factor, but in price corridors of up 
to 60CHF/MWh, the fee design can make the difference 
between profitability and loss for some companies—and 
Table 5 Risk shift from resource users to resource owners
Regime Market risk RMP Technology differences
Fixed - Resource owners receive constant water fee payments
- Entire market risk lies with the resource users
Flexible - Water fee payments depend on market prices Differentiated In low-price years:
- (Pumped) storage plants have a relative advan-
tage
- Run-of-river plants pay relatively more
- Relatively higher revenues for low-land cantons
Uniform In low price years:
- Run-of-river plants have a relative advantage
- Market risk is partly shifted from resource user to resource 
owner
- (Pumped) storage plants pay relatively more
- In low-price years: lower revenues, especially for mountain 
cantons
- Relatively higher revenues for mountain cantons
Resource Rent Tax - Water fee payments depend on market prices and production 
costs
- Market risk is partly shifted from resource user to resource 
owner
23 See www. bfe. admin. ch/ bfe/ de/ home/ news- und- medien/ medie nmitt eilun 
gen/ mm- test. msg- id- 81068. html and www. newsd. admin. ch/ newsd/ messa ge/ 
attac hments/ 63715. pdf.
24 See www. bfe. admin. ch/ bfe/ de/ home/ news- und- medien/ medie nmitt eilun 
gen/ mm- test. msg- id- 81068. html and www. newsd. admin. ch/ newsd/ messa ge/ 
attac hments/ 63715. pdf.
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could, therefore, also tip investment decisions—especially 
for retrofit investments. As both a flexible fee and a tax 
would actually lower income prospects in favorable market 
conditions, a shift towards these conditions might reduce 
overall investment incentives, assuming that in unfavora-
ble market conditions investment prospects are likely to 
remain negative regardless of the water fee regime. On 
the other hand, the historic development of the fixed fee 
has shown that also this level can be adjusted, especially 
in times of favorable market prices. Such an adjustment 
would lead to similar income effects for suppliers as a 
more flexible regime—however with the downside of not 
automatically reverting in case of price reductions.
Fourth, as explained in Sect.  2.1, the overall profit-
ability of Swiss hydropower has already been a concern in 
recent years. As a consequence of the challenging liquid-
ity situation caused by the decreasing market prices, 
a temorary support system has been initiated. The so-
called ‘Marktprämie Grosswasserkraft’ (market premium 
for large hydropower projects) provides financial support 
for plants that have to sell at prices below cost and is refi-
nanced via a surcharge on network tariffs.25 It is limited 
for the period 2018 to 2022, and in the first three years it 
paid out CHF 101, 65, and 85 million respectively.
Our assessment shows that implementing a flexible fee 
system could, potentially, have reduced those payments 
as a share of companies would have been pushed closer 
to break-even in the lower-priced scenarios. A negative 
tax on resource rents (i.e., the resource owner pays the 
companies to compensate some of their losses incurred 
by low electricity prices) would have led to (hypothetical) 
payments that are comparable with the payments for the 
market premium.
Both the envisioned support mechanism for the 
2  TWh increase in winter production and the market 
premium indicate that Swiss policy makers are willing 
to spend money on Swiss hydropower to maintain and 
extend its generation capabilities. As the adjustments of 
the water fee regime will necessarily come with a real-
location of risks, financial opportunities, and burdens, 
one can expect opposition by those companies, can-
tons, and municipalities that would lose income. At the 
same time, our assessment shows that a reform will likely 
have a rather limited overall impact on the profitability 
of Swiss hydropower. Together, this setting suggests that 
a continuation of the status quo might—from a politi-
cal point of view—not be an unlikely option. However, 
Table 6 Notation used for the Swissmod model
Indices/sets Parameters
n ∈ N Power nodes mc Marginal cost
l ∈ L Power lines d Demand
t ∈ T Time periods (hours) res Renewables in-feed
cp ∈ CP Conventional power plants ηTurbhp Production equivalent [MWh/1000  m
3]
hp ∈ HP Hydropower plants ηPumphp
Pumping efficiency factor
wn,wn, wn ∈ WN Water nodes CH (above, below) ηrthp Pumping round-trip efficiency
co ∈ CO Countries inj Natural inflow to water node [1000  m3]
Matrices chp Combined heat and power
incn,l Power grid incidence ∈ {0,1, − 1} gmaxcp Generation capacity
Variables turbmaxhp Turbine capacity [MW]
G Electricity generation pumpmaxhp Pump capacity [MW]
Turb Discharge (in water for CH, in electricity for EU) avail Availability conventional power plants
Pump Pumping (in water for CH, in electricity for EU) smax Storage capacity [MW for EU, 1000  m3 for CH]
Cur Curtailment of renewables turbprofilehp,t
Run-of-river profile (for EU)
F Line flow turbyearhp Dam generation per year (for EU)
S Storage level susceptancel Line susceptance
WI Water inflow voltbase Line voltage base
WO Water outflow fmaxl Line capacity
Spill Spillage securitymargin Line security margin
Transfer Water transferred to other water node (without 
turbining or pumping)
X Phase angle difference
25 For further details, see https:// www. bfe. admin. ch/ bfe/ de/ home/ foerd erung/ 
erneu erbare- energ ien/ markt praem ie- gross wasse rkraft. html.
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subsidizing hydropower plants with revenues from net-
work surcharges is not a long-term solution but should 
be replaced by a more transparent policy design.
To achieve an adjustment of the current water fee 
regime before the required legal renewal in 2024, policy 
makers need to take into account the risk distribution 
between the different parties involved and their ability to 
manage changing income levels. Specifically, this raises 
the question of which of the players (i.e., hydropower 
plants, cantons, and/or municipalities) are best able to 
cope with such risks. From a resource owner perspec-
tive, it might be necessary to introduce complementing 
compensation mechanisms for cantons and municipali-
ties which depend on the income from water fees. From 
a resource user perspective, companies can hedge market 
price risks in the short run through the forward electric-
ity market. However, there is no long-term forward mar-
ket and there are no counterparties to hedge long-term 
risk. Therefore, additional regulations in the form of a 

































Capacity limit chpcp,t ≤ Gcp,t ≤ g
max
cp availcp,t ∀cp, t (3)
Curtailment limit Curn,t ≤ resn,t ∀n, t (4)
Hydro CH:













∀hp ∈ CH, t (6)
Storage balance Swn,t = Swn,t−1 +WIwn,t −WOwn,t ∀wn ∈ CH, t (7)













∀wn ∈ CH, t (8)













∀wn ∈ CH, t (9)
Storage limit Swn,t ≤ smaxwn ∀wn ∈ CH, t (10)
Hydro EU (i.e., neighbors):
Turbine capacity limit TurbEUhp,t ≤ turb
max
hp
∀hp ∈ EU, t (11)
Pump capacity limit PumpEUhp,t ≤ pump
max
hp
∀hp ∈ EU, t (12)









∀co ∈ EU, t (13)









∀co ∈ EU, t (15)








∀co ∈ EU (16)
Electricity grid:
Line flow Fl,t = susceptancel
∑
n incn,lXn,tvoltbase ∀l, t (17)






≤ fmaxl (1− securitymargin) ∀l, t (19)
Fig. 8 Comparing observed (“real”) and simulated (“model”) 
day-ahead market prices for Switzerland for 2015. Note: Boxplots for 
hourly prices in EUR/MWh. Real market prices from EPEX SPOT SE
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cash reserve might be needed, where a share of profits 
from periods with high electricity prices covers losses 
when electricity prices are low. This reserve would ensure 
that the gains generated in good times will be banked 
for times of low electricity prices (or reinvested). Such 
a mechanism would ensure that the gains incurred by 
public companies or jurisdictions would not be used to 




Swissmod (Schlecht & Weigt, 2014) is a classical dispatch 
model for Switzerland and its neighboring countries of 
Germany, Austria, France, and Italy. The model (notation 
and mathematical formulation) is outlined in Tables 6 and 
7. In the Swissmod version used in this paper, the objective 
of the model is to minimize the total system cost over the 
annual time horizon considered (Eq. 1). The costs are deter-
mined by the marginal costs of the conventional power 
plants which are defined by fuel prices,  CO2 price, plant 
emission factor, and plant efficiency. Electricity demand 
and supply from conventional, renewable, or hydropower 
plants (considering power flows) must be balanced at 
each node (location) in each hour (Eq. 2). With its hourly 
time resolution, the market that Swissmod simulates cor-
responds to today’s day-ahead wholesale markets in which 
hourly products (or blocks of combined hours) are traded. 
Hourly prices in Swissmod can be derived from the shadow 
price or dual variable on the nodal balance. However, these 
prices represent hourly nodal prices (or locational marginal 
prices), whereas in today’s market design there is a single 
price per country. Therefore, the hourly day-ahead prices 
for each country are derived in Swissmod by calculating the 
average values of the hourly nodal prices per country.
Due to the importance of hydropower in Switzerland, 
it is modeled in great detail by considering some 400 
hydropower stations (accounting for 96% of Switzer-
land’s hydropower generation from run-of-river, storage 
and pumped storage plants) with their underlying cas-
cade structures, water flows along these cascades, and 
the resulting interdependencies in the cascades (Eqs. 5 to 
10). Hydropower plants in Swissmod do not have a direct 
marginal cost but operate under an implicit considera-
tion of their opportunity cost or water values (which can 
be derived from the shadow price or dual variable of the 
storage balance (Eq. 7)). The revenue of each hydropower 
plant can be calculated ex-post from the hourly power 
plant dispatch and the simulated hourly market prices.
Hydropower in the neighboring countries is modeled 
in an aggregated (country level) representation (Eqs. 11 to 
16). The power flow in Switzerland and across the borders 
is simulated by a DC load flow approach (Eqs.  17 to 19), 
which provides a detailed representation of the Swiss trans-
mission grid by dividing Switzerland into approximately 
230 locations (nodes) interconnected by 400 transmission 
lines (380  kV and 220  kV). Interconnected neighboring 
countries are included in an aggregated, less detailed repre-
sentation (using a smaller number of nodes and lines).
Model calibration
The model was calibrated for the year 2015. When 
comparing the observed and simulated market prices 
for Switzerland (Fig.  8), it can be seen that the prices 
are well in line with the annual average (or median). 
However, the prices differ in their spread (quartiles 
and extremes). While the simulated market prices are 
a good representation of the classic annual profile with 
higher prices in winter and lower prices in summer, 
they have a much lower dispersion than observed in the 
market. This is due to the fact that complex technical 
constraints (startup/shutdown, ramp-up/down, mini-
mum up/down time), which are important in reality, 
are not considered in Swissmod.
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